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AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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The UN in a Revolutionary Age

by Hans Kohn

To a future historian the most important event of the 20th century may easily be, not Lenin's overthrow of the short-lived free regime in Russia in 1918, but the end of Europe's 300-year-old undisputed leadership of the world.

This change, which a few decades ago hardly anyone foresaw and which now progresses with bewildering rapidity, produces many serious strains, and demands painful and far-reaching reappraisals and readjustments. The shift of gravity takes place simultaneously at several levels. In the Western world the political and economic power-center has been transferred from Western Europe to North America. In the free world as a whole the influence of Asian and African nations, many of whom did not exist at all a few years ago, is irresistibly gaining. Even in the totalitarian world of communism the Asian partner, China, is fast asserting a role of leadership, as shown by Chou En-lai's recent visits to Warsaw, Budapest and Moscow to help settle conflicts among European Communists.

In such a revolutionary situation the United Nations gains added importance as compared with the League of Nations. The League was still predominantly a European, not a world,

organization. Its members were hardly conscious of the deep-seated changes produced by World War I, which became evident only when Germany and Japan sought to undo the outcome of the war and thereby intensified its effects.

The League of Nations operated within a seemingly still stable world. It was unable to cope with the problems brought before it for the very reason that it took the continuation of the existing power-system for granted. The UN differs fundamentally from the League. It is on the way to becoming a truly world-wide organization. Its membership has increased within eleven years from 51 to 81. It is conscious of the need for accommodation in a revolutionary stage of transition. There is good hope that the UN will prove more successful than the League of Nations.

Naturally, shifts of power and revolutionary changes arouse many discontents, fears and complaints. No system of representation anywhere can be perfect. In the UN today the peoples of Asia and Africa, who form the majority of mankind, are underrepresented as compared with the peoples of Europe or of Latin America. Economically and militarily

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giant powers like the United States or the U.S.S.R. have legally no stronger voting power than Luxembourg, Costa Rica or Yemen. But it would be difficult to find any system of "just" representation. Certain injustices are inherent in democracy. Within a democratic nation the richest taxpayers have no more votes than the poorest unemployed; in fact there were periods in the history of all democracies when the rich complained that they were paying the largest share whereas the mass vote decided how to spend the nation's funds. It took some time to work out an adjustment of this problem in the democracies, and today the system works well—as a result of a sense of restraint on all sides, which alone is the basis of successful political and social arrangements.

Sense of Responsibility

Fortunately the General Assembly of the UN, faced during its recent session with the inflammatory issues of aggression against Egypt, of intervention in Hungary and of colonial war in Algeria, also showed on the whole a remarkable sense of moderation and responsibility. Thus, in the Assembly emerged a first expression—perhaps only a promise for the future—of an unwritten but nevertheless powerful world law. In this respect the United States has exercised a salutary influence. American leadership in the UN thwarted the fundamental Communist strategy, which goes back to Lenin, of mobilizing the entire non-Western world against the West. Backed by the growing

confidence of non-Western peoples, the United States was able to carry through the Assembly a resolution in the Algerian case which avoided hurting France's feelings and gave the French more time to arrive at a solution that might satisfy legitimate Arab demands. The non-Western peoples supported the United States; not the U.S.S.R., in the Hungarian struggle for liberty—a situation which could have been dealt with more effectively if the invasion of Egypt had not provided the Russians with an alibi.

Blocs Not a Danger

On the whole the United States and the West can be satisfied with their influence and position in the UN. They do not always get what they want, but that is impossible in any democratic international organization. No one should always "win." Like every democratic institution, the Assembly of the UN constitutes a parliament in which various members, blocs and pressure groups try to exercise their influence to win their point or arrive at compromises.

During this session some complaint has been heard about "blocs" in the General Assembly. Naturally enough, the Western powers do not complain about a Western bloc, nor the Soviet countries about a Soviet bloc. They all complain about what appears to them hostile blocs. But such blocs hardly exist as rigid formations. Only the Soviet bloc is rigid, but it is in a permanent and, for it, very painful minority position. The other groups form roughly three blocs—the West-

ern bloc, the Afro-Asian bloc and the Latin American bloc. Yet these groups are, as they should be, fluid. They cooperate in various instances. Their members vote in complete freedom according to their interests and moral convictions. In this very fluidity lies the hope for progress by the UN on the long-sought road to a world forum of authority, in which for the first time in history all human races and civilizations—great and small, advanced and backward—can meet on a footing of legal equality and try to solve the difficult problems of world-wide accommodation to revolutionary changes by the democratic ways of discussion and moral pressure.

Many Kinds of Colonialism

Of these problems, "colonialism" is more complex than it appears to powers which think of themselves as noncolonial. European rule in the world was not the result of any evil intentions but the inevitable outcome of a temporary great cultural, moral and social superiority. Thanks to European colonization, and above all to British influence, this superiority has in recent years diminished and is now perhaps disappearing. As a result, the era of European colonialism is nearing its end. The first to understand this outcome of colonialism was Britain. From the White Paper of 1922 for Palestine and the termination of the mandate over Iraq in 1928 to the proclamation of the independence of India in 1947 and of Ghana in 1957, Britain has

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Foreign-Aid Anomalies

There are innumerable problems, some surprising anomalies, and a host of misconceptions about foreign aid—or “mutual security” as the Administration prefers to call it; and one short article can hardly cover or dispose of them all. But it may at least indicate what makes “foreign aid” such a controversial and difficult problem. In the abstract, few people object to aid. It’s humanitarian; it does good; it isn’t too expensive considering our gross national product; it makes friends for the United States. But the trouble comes when you start being specific. Aid whom? And how much?

Should the United States extend aid just to its friends? You can find some mighty respectable people, including some Senators, who feel this way. But then what about neutrals—what about India, Burma, Indonesia? And what about the Soviet satellites—are any or all of them eligible or suitable to receive aid? Specifically, what about Poland? And what about Yugoslavia, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan? And what about Egypt, Israel, Syria? Should the United States refuse help to Yugoslavia, a Communist state—or should we help it because, while a national Communist state, it is not fostering international communism? And should Poland get a loan and agricultural aid to help it be less dependent on Moscow, or would aid to Warsaw merely be indirectly aiding Moscow? And if we aid Yugoslavia and Poland, what about Hungary?

One anomaly of the current foreign-aid debate is that the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue are vying with each other both in urging continuance of foreign aid while arguing about the feasibility of budget cuts.

President Eisenhower fears that substantial budget cuts would endanger the country’s security. The Senate’s studies of foreign aid favor its continuance. And the public seems to be impressively in favor of aid.

For example, a nation-wide poll showed that 64 percent of the people think aid helps the United States and should be continued; and more than 50 percent even think that neutralist countries should get aid. Representative Perkins Bass, Republican of New Hampshire, received the surprise of his life when he polled his constituents and discovered that they favored continued aid to Yugoslavia 2 to 1—and this just after furor on Capitol Hill held up an invitation to President Tito of Yugoslavia to visit Washington.

Public for Aid

It should be pointed out, however, that the questions presented in these polls are in a way loaded. People were asked whether neutralist countries should or should not receive aid, whether aid was good or bad for the United States. They were not asked whether they preferred balancing the budget to extending foreign aid, or whether they preferred a tax cut for themselves to foreign aid for Messrs. Nehru, Tito, Gomulka or Chiang. Ask them if aid should go to Tito, and they will say, “Yes.” But ask them if Tito should receive aid in place of tax cuts or drought assistance, and they will say, “No.”

One thing that perplexes not a few Congressmen is that their constituents want to eat their cake and have it too—and expect their representatives to make that possible. They want to aid Burma and Formosa,

Korea and Vietnam, but they also want tax cuts, farm supports, more highways and better schools. The dilemma facing Congress is that it has to cut up the national finance pie—while the constituents only have to eat it after it is cut.

Separation of Aid

One thing that may come out of all this discussion, poll-taking, White House and congressional examination of foreign aid, is a clear separation of economic from military aid. Hitherto the two have been lumped together, and this lumping has caused much of the confusion. With two-thirds or more of foreign aid going to military purposes, the military have, of course, favored this lumping formula, for it provided them with \$2 billion or \$3 billion more in military items which they did not have to defend in the military budget. In other words, the military budget, except for this system of joining military and economic aid under the title of foreign aid, would be several billion dollars higher than it is now. And, conversely, the strictly foreign “aid”—that is, economic and technical aid going abroad—would be much smaller.

It is true that some military aid has economic overtones, and in some cases it would be hard to differentiate which is which. But certainly, all military equipment supplied our allies, all “defense-support” items, as they are called, should show up in the military budget and have to be defended by the military—not by Secretary of State Dulles and his aides.

NEAL STANFORD



Magsaysay: Asian Reformer

The most tragic aspect of the death of President Ramón Magsaysay of the Philippines in the crash of his plane on Cebu Island on March 18 is that it removes from the Asian scene one of the postwar leaders who was peculiarly aware that economic and social reforms are the most effective way of checking communism.

Unlike some of the spokesmen of contemporary nationalism who have come from the aristocratic or intellectual circles of their countries, Magsaysay was a "man of the people," with a sensitive understanding of the needs and aspirations of the peasants among whom he was born. Son of a schoolteacher, who taught carpentry and was also a farmer and blacksmith, the late president, as Carlos P. Romulo puts it in his recently published book, *The Magsaysay Story* (John Day), was born in "the Philippine equivalent of a log cabin—a hut of bamboo and cogon grass."

During the Japanese conquest and in the difficult decade of postwar reconstruction he constantly displayed the deep concern for the "little people" which made him a living symbol of Philippine independence— independence not only from foreign rule and Communist influence but also from corruption and reaction at home.

The achievement for which Magsaysay will be best remembered by his own people and by the rest of the world is his indefatigable effort to defeat the Communists by depriving them of their most powerful weapon—agrarian discontent. When Japan invaded the Islands in 1941, the Communists organized the Hukbalahap movement, which combined the struggle against the Japanese with a

struggle for agrarian change. This approach won the support of farmers.

Fight on Agrarian Front

The end of the war did not end agrarian unrest. Attempts by the government to suppress the Huks, who claimed to speak for the tenant farmers, only served to foment resistance. Members of the local constabulary were regarded by villagers as agents of the hated landlords, who along with businessmen were heavily represented in the country's two political parties, the Nationalists and the Liberals. The Huks, led by Communist Luis Taruc, harassed government forces with arms they had acquired during the guerrilla fighting against the Japanese.

It was the genius of Magsaysay that he, like Nehru in India and U Nu in Burma, promptly recognized the necessity of meeting the Communist threat, not by force alone, but by elimination of the legitimate grievances on which the Communists thrived. Appointed minister of defense in 1950, Magsaysay replaced the hated constabulary with units of the regular army and eventually put it under army control. He protected the peasants against both the constabulary and the Huks, encouraged the Huks to surrender, and provided them with land and tools to establish themselves as owner-farmers.

Elected president in 1953 under the banner of the Nationalist party, which promised to end Huk resistance and to wipe out corruption, Magsaysay tried hard to achieve both objectives, often against the opposition of professional politicians, landowners and businessmen. He created a Complaints and Actions Commission to investigate and handle griev-

ances, which he invited the people to express to the government. He worked overtime to purge the administration of corruption and nepotism, among other things by improving methods of tax collection. He won the ultimate triumph in his struggle against the Communists by obtaining the surrender of Taruc, who was brought to trial. And, most important of all, he put into effect an Agricultural Tenancy Act, to be administered by a Tenancy Commission, which set the tenant's share of crops at a minimum of 30 percent of the harvest and gave him an opportunity to seek redress for his grievances through the courts.

Magsaysay's philosophy of anti-communism was simple and direct. He used to tell his administrative assistants: "One thing I want you to remember. You must pay attention to the little fellow. The big people always manage to take care of themselves." And, again: "If I did not help the little people, then the Communists would. I cut the ground from under the Communists by doing for the people what the Communists would only promise to do."

The experience of the Philippines in its first decade of independence demonstrates that important as economic aid and military security undoubtedly are, the first and most potent ingredient of liberty in the non-Western nations today, as it has been in Western nations, is constant vigilance to correct grievances and reform conditions that people have come to regard as intolerable. The question now is whether Magsaysay's successor to be chosen in the November elections will continue his reforms or let them fall into desuetude.

VERA MICHELES DEAN



Should U.S. Give Aid to Communist Countries?

by
Senator John F. Kennedy
Senator William F. Knowland

(The problem of United States economic aid to Russia's satellites in Eastern Europe has been raised in sharp form by negotiations which opened in Washington on February 26, between a Polish delegation and the Department of State. Poland was reported to have requested \$200 million worth of surplus farm products to be paid for in zlotys, and a \$100 million Export-Import Bank loan to purchase machinery. A barrier to the Export-Import loan is the Battle Act, which prohibits such loans to countries trading in war materials with the U.S.S.R.)

A study prepared by the Council for Economic and Industry Research, Inc., a commercial organization—one of 11 commissioned by the Special Senate Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program—stated that “economic aid to satellite nations, as a counteroffensive against the Soviet Union, stands little prospect of success.” After conceding the possible “psychological” advantages of aid to Soviet satellites, the study, released on March 14, declared that “any substantial economic aid merely serves to strengthen the total economic system the Communist bloc is able to administer and exploit.” It said further: “If United States aid in the form of food, raw materials and possibly capital goods, were allowed to flow into the satellites, there is no assurance even that the satellite peoples will gain a net benefit, since equal amounts might be diverted elsewhere.”

Two contrasting views on the advisability of aid to Poland are presented below.—*The Editor*)

John F. Kennedy

Text of letter dated March 12, 1957 from Senator Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles with respect to aid to Poland. Released to newspapers on March 13, 1957:

DEAR Mr. Secretary: I am writing to reassure you that there is within the Congress a considerable body of opinion which would look with favor upon an Administration decision approving economic assistance to the people of Poland.

Despite the unfortunate extent to which the Communists retain control over the present Polish government, the Polish people themselves have made a determined and courageous fight to win some degree of national independence from the Soviet Union. They appear to have been at least temporarily successful in lessening the iron control that the Soviets have hitherto exercised over their lives—and their ability and willingness to turn to this nation for assistance for the first time should be encouraged, not castigated. If there is even a slight chance that this demonstration of friendship on our part will help the Polish people to loosen further the bonds of Soviet domination, then the obvious gains to this nation and the free world will have been well worth the effort. If, on the other hand, Poland should once again slip completely behind the Iron Curtain, then this nation will have at least demonstrated to the world our willingness to help impoverished people in any land, whatever

the political situation may be.

I recognize, of course, that others have pointed out advantages for us in refusing aid to the Poles—it will make matters more difficult for their Communist government and absentee Soviet masters, and it will demonstrate our recognition of the degree to which the Polish government is still within the orbit of Soviet control and ideology. But hunger has never been a weapon of American foreign policy—and if we can score these “cold-war” advantages only by turning a deaf ear to Polish hunger and misery, then we will have won a dubious “victory” at best.

Hunger Not U.S. Weapon

It is true, too, that we have thus far looked in vain for any Polish move to better relations between our nations—such as lifting those restrictions that make it difficult for Polish citizens to accept private gifts of food and other material from relatives and friends in this country. But these issues can never be settled satisfactorily if this nation refuses to negotiate on their requests to us.

As a result of the systematic policy of economic and political exploitation the Russians have carried out within Poland in the last decade, the Polish people are extremely hard-pressed to maintain even a minimum standard of living. This economic problem is being accentuated by the fact that many thousands of Poles previously deported to Siberia are now returning to their native land homeless, hungry, destitute, and in poor health.

I visited Poland less than two years

ago, and I know first-hand of the population's rejection of Communist philosophy. Poland may still be a satellite government—but the Poles are not satellite people. To deny them help because they have not been able to shake off total Communist control would be a brutal and dangerous policy, either increasing their dependence on Russia or driving them into the slaughter of a fruitless, premature revolt.

Such assistance, of course, should contain the strongest possible safeguards to prevent its exploitation for political purposes by the Polish government. Particular attention should be focused on those forms of assistance which will be of direct benefit to the Polish people, such as the shipment of surplus foodstuffs and the sale of farm machinery.

I realize, of course, that international political considerations are involved here; but, important as these considerations are, they should not obscure the basic human values at stake.

Sincerely yours,
JOHN F. KENNEDY

William F. Knowland

A speech by Senator Knowland to the Senate as printed in the Congressional Record, February 28, 1957, Vol. 103, No. 34:

MR. KNOWLAND: Mr. President, on February 25, the Soviet Union introduced before the Special Political Committee of the United Nations a resolution labeled "Complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Intervention by the United States of America in the Domestic Affairs of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Its Subversive Activity Against Those States."

I ask unanimous consent that the

full text of the resolution be printed at this point in the body of the *Record*, in connection with my remarks.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

Complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Intervention by the United States of America in the Domestic Affairs of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Its Subversive Activity Against Those States

*Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Draft Resolution*

"The General Assembly,

"Noting with anxiety the recent aggravation of the international situation and the deterioration of relations between states;

"Noting that this situation has been caused, among other things, by the subversive activities of the United States of America and its intervention in the domestic affairs of the people's democracy;

"Considering that the states members of the United Nations are bound under the Charter 'to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors';

"Recalling that in its Resolution 110 of November 3, 1947 the General Assembly condemns 'all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression';

"Taking also into consideration the fact that the General Assembly on December 17, 1954 recommended to member states the international convention of the use of broadcasting in the interests of peace of 1936 in which the contracting parties 'mutually undertake to prohibit and, if necessary, to bring to an immediate

stop in their respective territories any transmission which could, to the detriment of proper international understanding, instigate the inhabitants of any territory to acts contrary to the internal order or security of the territory of one of the high contracting parties';

"1. Condemns the subversive activities of the United States of America against other states as contrary to the United Nations Charter and incompatible with the principles on which relations between states should be based;

"2. Calls upon the United States Government to cease its subversive activity and its intervention in the domestic affairs of other states on any pretext and to develop its relations with these states in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter."

UN Resolution and Polish Loan

Mr. President, the resolution speaks for itself, and each member of the Senate can examine it at his leisure. However, I wish to call the attention of the Senate to the entire language of the resolution, and particularly that appearing in the next to the last paragraph, reading as follows:

"1. Condemns the subversive activities of the United States of America against other states as contrary to the United Nations Charter and incompatible with the principles on which relations between states should be based."

Mr. President, I am pleased to report to the Senate that when this matter came to a vote on yesterday before the Special Political Committee, the resolution was rejected by a vote of 53 to 8. The only countries whose representatives voted in favor of the resolution were the Soviet Union and the captive nations, which were Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia,

Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Poland.

Parenthetically, Mr. President, I wish to say that the representatives of the Gomulka government of Poland are now in Washington, seeking to negotiate a loan, which has been reported in the newspapers as being \$100 million. I hope the government of the United States will call to the attention of those negotiators the fact that just yesterday the representative of their government at the United Nations, before the Special Political Committee, voted to condemn the alleged subversive activities of the United States of America, as I have previously read.

So far as I am concerned, Mr. President, I shall not support any Communist Marshall Plan.

MR. HUMPHREY: Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield?

MR. KNOWLAND: I yield.

MR. HUMPHREY: As an associate in the United States delegation to the United Nations, along with the distinguished Senator from California, let me say we were very proud of the address he made to the Special Political Committee, which address has been made a part of the *Record*. He stated the United States government's position in response to that Soviet resolution; and he stated it clearly, concisely and effectively. Personally, I wish to commend him for that excellent job and that splendid address.

The Senator from California is a man of deep convictions and great courage, and I know he has stated here in the Senate his thoughts respecting certain economic and political relationships with countries associated with or friendly to the Soviet Union; and in view of his important position in the Senate and in his party, I trust that he has also conveyed those views to the President

and to the Secretary of State and to others in responsible executive positions in our government. I am sure he has done so.

Kohn

(Continued from page 114)

successfully pointed the way to accommodation with the new aspirations aroused by British concepts and practice of liberty.

But "colonial" problems exist not only in the shrinking European empires or in the expanding Soviet dominion. They exist also in many of the Asian, African and Latin American states. Many of them have backward or minority tribes and regions which are now beginning to clamor for independence, self-government, equality of opportunity and status.

All these movements everywhere—and in spite of what Asian and African "inverted racialists" sometimes believe, they have little to do with

"race"—form part of the slow and painful ascent of underprivileged groups and peoples toward a fuller share in the social and cultural realm, which was first promised by the achievements of modern Western civilization. This process started in Europe in the 19th century and is now proceeding with revolutionary rapidity all over the globe. To direct it into constructive channels and to prevent the inevitable tensions, anxieties and "provocations" from degenerating into aggression and into class and race wars, is the great task of the UN, which it alone can fulfill when wisely and generously guided. As far as I can interpret recent American policy, the Eisenhower Administration, with all its imperfections, has set out to do this very thing.

Mr. Kohn is professor of modern European history at City College of New York. His latest book, *American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay*, will be published by Macmillan in May.



FPA Bookshelf

The New American Library has just issued, as a paperback original, a new book by Vera Micheles Dean and three other authors, entitled *The Nature of the Non-Western World* (New York, Mentor, 1957, 50 cents). This book is based on the introductory course in the Non-Western Civilizations Program which Mrs. Dean has been directing at the University of Rochester for the past three years. The other authors are her two associates in this program, Dr. Warren S. Hunsberger, Haloid Professor of International Economics, and Dr. Harry J. Benda, Assistant Professor of History, and also Dr. Vernon McKay, Professor of African Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. The book is a broad survey, written in popular style, of the historical development, contemporary problems, and future prospects of the non-Western areas of the globe, including Russia, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America, and of their relations with the West. Mentor address: 501 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.

American Heritage, known as The Magazine of History, is a beautifully bound and

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NOVELS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

In *A Dance in the Sun* (New York, Harcourt, 1956, \$3.50), Dan Jacobson, a talented young South African novelist, gives a grim but remarkably perceptive picture of explosive relations between Afrikaners and Kaffirs. In contrast to the tragic tales we have received since World War II from Japan, *The Sound of Waves* (New York, Knopf, 1956, \$3.00), by Yukio Mishima, is a beautifully written and moving tale of young love among Japanese fisher-folk. At the other pole Osamu Dazai in *The Setting Sun* (New York, New Directions, 1956, \$3.00) distills the frustrations, anxieties and disorientation of an aristocracy in de-

cline which seeks a way out in suicide or resignation. It is significant, and understandable, that the heroine of this harsh novel compares her lot to that of characters in Chekhov's *Cherry Orchard*.

A Forest of Tigers, by Robert Shaplen. New York, Knopf, 1956. \$3.95.

This is an apt title for an intriguing novel which serves as background for an American newspaperman's pessimistic critique of the part the U.S. played in Vietnam during the Indochinese war. At the same time it gives the reader a somewhat confusing look at the forces involved in a many-sided conflict which makes American politics look like a game of marbles.

THE BALKANS

In his scholarly and readable book, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956, \$8.00), Robert Lee Wolff, professor of history at Harvard University, has crammed a lot of valuable material about Rumania, Hungary, Albania and Yugoslavia into one volume. The book gives background information from Byzantine times through World War II, and then describes at length how the Communists acquired power, and what they have done with it, concluding with 1954 events.

Vladimir Gsovski, chief of the Foreign Law Section of the Library of Congress, has edited a study of *Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, Praeger, 1955, \$5.00) for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, Inc. It describes the position of the church in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Poland.

Among books on individual countries is *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes*, translated by Godfrey Lias (Boston, Houghton, 1955, \$7.50), which covers events that led to Munich and Nazi occupation. Eric I. Pridonoff gives a candid and personal account of his experiences in Yugoslavia as a United States Department of State official during World War II in *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1955, \$3.75). Concluding that Tito has never had any fundamental differences with communism, he analyzes recent conditions in Yugoslavia.

Croatia, now part of Yugoslavia, has inspired several individual studies. Volume I of *A History of the Croatian People* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1955, \$7.50), by Francis R. Preveden, a Croatian who is now with the United States Department of Defense, covers in minute detail the period from earliest times to the 15th century. It is a handsome book, beautifully illustrated, with loose maps.

BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH

In *Your England* (New York, Putnam, 1956, \$4.00) Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart, a Scotsman who has served Britain in many high diplomatic posts, gives a shrewd, lively and amusing comment about his adopted country. A more serious study of Britain is made in a small volume, by T. K. Derry and T. L. Jarman, entitled *The Making of Modern Britain* (New York, New York University Press, 1956, \$3.50). It analyzes social developments from the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution to the welfare state.

Portrait of a Statesman, by Dennis Bards (New York, Philosophical Library, 1956, \$6.00), details the personal life of Sir Anthony Eden and at the same time throws some light on British foreign policy.

In *America and the British Left: From Bright to Bevan* (New York, New York University Press, 1957, \$3.50) Henry M. Pelling traces the attitude of the British left toward the United States from the Civil War to the present day. This book contains much material not used hitherto.

A very detailed and comprehensive study of *Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain* is presented in an authoritative book of that title (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956, \$6.00), by B. C. Roberts, a lecturer at the London School of Economics.

Some interesting books on the British Empire and Commonwealth are *The British Empire* by Eric A. Walker (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956, \$5.00); *The British Commonwealth: An Experiment in Cooperation Among Nations*, by Frank H. Underhill (published for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center by Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1956, \$2.00); and *British*

Malaya: An Economic Analysis by Dun J. Li, Ph.D. (New York, American Press, 1956, \$3.00).

Two British authors, Alan and Mary Wood, write a vivid account of the World War II German occupation of the Channel Islands—the only part of British or American territory so occupied by enemy forces—in *Islands in Danger* (New York, Macmillan, 1956, \$3.50).

Sir Alan Burns, who served in the British Colonial Service for 42 years, in his latest authoritative book, *In Defense of Colonies* (New York, Macmillan, 1957, \$5.75), examines the positive achievements of British colonial policy.

REFERENCE BOOKS

The Statesman's Year-Book 1956 (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1956, \$8.50), edited by S. H. Steinberg, contains useful information on every country, territory and principality in the world; as well as details, on oil production and international organizations such as NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community and the Colombo Plan. The *Political Handbook of the World*, edited by Walter H. Mallory (New York, Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957, \$3.95) also gives details about governments and political parties of many nations as well as the political affiliations and editors of their leading newspapers and periodicals. Another handy reference source is the *Information Please Almanac 1957* (New York, Macmillan, 1956, \$1.00), edited by Dan Golenpaul. It includes a guide to the main historical, political, economic, geographical and social facts concerning all nations from Afghanistan to Yugoslavia.

For complementary information on individual countries, the British Information Services is the agent for *Britain: An Official Handbook* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956, \$2.81 including postage). This is not only a useful reference book, but is attractively written and contains numerous maps, charts and photographs. The *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1956* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1956, \$3.75) is invaluable for up-to-date detailed information about this country.

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